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Recently, there has been growing interest in understanding how executive functions
are conceptualized in psychopathology. Since several models have been proposed,
the major issue lies within the definition of executive functioning itself. Theoretical
discussions have emerged, narrowing the boundaries between “hot” and “cold”
executive functions or between self-regulation and cognitive control. Nevertheless,
the definition of executive functions is far from a consensual proposition and it has
been suggested that these models might be outdated. Current efforts indicate that
human behavior and cognition are by-products of many brain systems operating and
interacting at different levels, and therefore, it is very simplistic to assume a dualistic
perspective of information processing. Based upon an adaptive perspective, we discuss
how executive functions could emerge from the ability to solve immediate problems
and to generalize successful strategies, as well as from the ability to synthesize and
to classify environmental information in order to predict context and future. We present
an executive functioning perspective that emerges from the dynamic balance between
automatic-controlled behaviors and an emotional-salience state. According to our
perspective, the adaptive role of executive functioning is to automatize efficient solutions
simultaneously with cognitive demand, enabling individuals to engage such processes
with increasingly complex problems. Understanding executive functioning as a mediator
of stress and cognitive engagement not only fosters discussions concerning individual
differences, but also offers an important paradigm to understand executive functioning
as a continuum process rather than a categorical and multicomponent structure.
Keywords: executive functions, cognitive control, self-regulation, neuropsychology, automatic process,
reasoning, stress, psychological
INTRODUCTION
The conceptualizations of executive functions have emerged from the observation of patients
who had suffered frontal lobe lesions and became unable to manipulate, integrate, and respond
to internal and external stimulus in the same way they used to do (Jurado and Rosselli, 2007;
Goldstein et al., 2014). Throughout the last few decades, a range of models have emerged and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 January 2017 | Volume 7 | Article 2067
fpsyg-07-02067 January 18, 2017 Time: 15:59 # 2
Kluwe-Schiavon et al. A Dynamic Executive Functioning Hypothesis
executive functions has become a multifaceted mental concept
that includes more than 30 different components (Barkley,
2001, 2012). Although these components were assumed to
be interrelated, their exact relationship has not been clearly
elucidated. After more than 40 years of studies, there is no
consensus regarding the definition of executive functions. The
concept previously included a variety of behaviors that were
broadly accepted as “high-order cognitive processes,” such as
inhibitory control, attention shifting, working memory, goal-
directed behavior, and strategic planning [for an extended review
of definitions please see (Goldstein et al., 2014)].
Based upon recent neuroscientific findings and theories
of cognitive sciences, this article questions this hierarchical
characteristic, as well as the multicomponent categorical
approaches, commonly attributed to executive functions, by
presenting a novel and testable dynamic executive functioning
hypothesis. Consequently, different from the majority of reviews
on this topic (Miyake et al., 2000; Collette et al., 2005; Jurado and
Rosselli, 2007; Tirapu-Ustarroz et al., 2008a,b; Kluwe-Schiavon
et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2014), it is not the aim of this article to
perform an updated overview concerning the theoretical models
of executive functions, nor discuss current evidences for the
reliability of unitary or multiple components models, and we do
not aim to describe the subcomponents that were mostly accepted
as “executive”.
In order to accomplish our goal, the article is organized
into three sections. In the first section, we briefly discuss the
hierarchical and categorical framework that supports the majority
of the models of executive functions, especially dual-processing
models. In the second section, we highlight a selection of
neuroscientific evidences to discuss stress as a core factor behind
executive functioning phylogeny, particularly, that stress should
be included in executive functioning models as a continuous
variable leading to different levels of homeostasis disturbance
and, as a consequence, cognitive engagement. The third section
introduces the executive functioning hypothesis, elucidating
similarities and differences between this perspective and some
of the current theoretical models in the field. In this section,
we also discuss that the so-called “executive” behaviors (e.g.,
set-shifting, cognitive flexibility, inhibition, and updating) that
could be comprehended as consequences of a permanent adaptive
switching between reflexive, conditioned, and goal-oriented
behaviors, instead of core individual, but interrelated, cognitive
components. Finally, the fourth section of the article discusses
subsequent testing of our executive functioning hypothesis and
future perspectives.
THE HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK OF
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
In an extensive review regarding executive functions, Goldstein
et al. (2014) clarified that the first hypotheses concerning the role
of prefrontal cortex (PFC) in human cognition were based upon
the theoretical backgrounds of selective attention and multi-
store memory models. These models suggested different linear
schemas, such as the Bottleneck theory of attention from Donald
Broadbent or the three component model from Richard Atkinson
and Richard Shiffrin, in order to explain how environmental
information are perceived, buffered, and retrieved for conscious
awareness (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971; Goldstein et al., 2014).
Although these models were able to distinguish automatic and
controlled cognitive processes, they did not completely explain
how information could be deliberatively selected or inhibited
during demanding attentional tasks. To fill this gap, the term
“cognitive control” was introduced in Posner and Snyder (1975)
to describe the capacity to manage thoughts and emotions,
allowing people to adapt behaviors across situations according
their goals (Goldstein et al., 2014).
Together with previous studies from Alexander Luria, these
dual-processing models – and subsequent models, such as the
Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) from Norman and Shallice
(1983) – were crucial to including the PFC as the main brain
structure involved in cognitive control, which was capable of
managing and regulating automatic behaviors (Luria, 1970;
Norman and Shallice, 1983).
The differences between automatic and controlled processes
driven by the cognitive revolution in psychology [for a review,
please see (Miller, 2003)] favored a hierarchical and categorical
approach, in which cognitive processes were organized as
independent, but inter-related components according to their
main functions, and aimed to decode the information processing
pathway between a stimulus and behavioral response. The
multicomponent working memory model proposed by Alan
Baddeley and Graham Hitch (Baddeley, 2012) could be viewed
as an example of this hierarchical and categorical reasoning, in
which three distinct slave systems are coordinated by a central
executive. However, according to Baddeley (2012), even though
the central executive is the most complex component of working
memory, it could be seen as a homunculus that represents
a marker of issues requiring explanation. Although Baddeley
(2012) suggested that in due course the homunculus might be
pensioned off, several models remain convinced that the PFC is
the “final frontier of neuropsychology” at the “center of human
nature” (Stuss, 2011), and that executive functions “are at the
heart of all socially useful, personally, enhancing, constructive,
and creative activities” (Lezak, 1982). In other words, hierarchical
and categorical approaches have often referred to executive
functions as a homunculus that inhibits our instincts and guides
our rational behavior.
This categorical approach can be widely observed in the
executive functions multicomponent models. Examples include
the four-component model hypothesized by (Lezak, 1995), as
well as the three core functions summarized by Diamond (2013).
The four-component model suggests that executive functions
consist of those capacities that enable a person to engage
successfully in independent, purposive, and self-serving behavior
(Lezak et al., 2012), such as volition, planning, purposeful action,
and effective performance (Goldstein et al., 2014). Similarly,
Diamond (2013) suggested that executive functions can be
described as a family of top down mental processes recruited
when automatic, instinct or intuition would be insufficient
to cope with an ongoing demand. Diamond relies upon the
assumption that there is a general agreement regarding three core
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executive functions: behavioral/cognitive inhibition (including
selective attention), working memory, and cognitive flexibility
(Diamond, 2013). These functions encourage individuals to not
act impulsively, hold information to solve problems, and apply
different approaches to a problem when facing new rules or
priorities (Diamond, 2013).
In general, both models were based upon clinical experience
and observation and they became expressive frameworks in
the neuropsychological field. According to our perspective, the
three main contributions of these models are: (i) hierarchical
and multicomponent approaches make it easier to define some
behaviors that seem to represent cognitive processes that could
not be classified as general automatic responses caused by
a stimulus (e.g., planning and cognitive flexibility); (ii) the
possibility to develop specific tasks to assess each component
independently (even theoretically considering that they are inter-
related), which fits with one of the main aims of neuropsychology
as a clinical field, to assess and treat patients with brain injury
or disease; and (iii) the possibility to provide an explanation
as to how executive dysfunction affects all aspects of behavior
differently from specific cognitive deficits (Lezak et al., 2012).
However, multicomponent models of executive functions are
still based upon the traditional framework of “cognitive control”
proposed by Posner and Snyder (2004), in which the PFC
plays an “executive” role over goal-oriented behaviors (Pribram,
1973) and emotional self-regulation (for a review on this
topic please see (Peterson and Welsh, 2014). To explain such
control medical imaging technologies, developmental research,
experimental psychology, and neurosciences have rescued dual-
processes theories to describe the so-called “cold” and “hot”
cognitive information processing systems (Sahlin et al., 2010;
Zelazo and Carlson, 2012).
Once more, many dualistic models have been proposed to
characterize these systems for an extensive review see (Evans,
2008). Usually, System 1 (or Type 1) demands stronger activation
of subcortical structures and could be defined as unconscious,
rapid, automatic, and allowed parallel information processing;
while System 2 (or Type 2) demands stronger activation of
cortical structures and could be defined as conscious, slow,
deliberative, and mostly responsible for serial information
processing (Kahneman, 2011; Noël et al., 2013). The idea of
an “emotional versus rational” thinking or neural system has
found support in several studies and has been extensively used to
describe cognitive changes associated with psychiatric disorders
and/or neurodevelopment. Some inhibition dysfunction theories
of addiction, for example, suggest that chronic drug use reduces
self-control, which is needed to inhibit the hedonic impulse to
take the rewarding drug again [for a review about models of
addiction please see (Emcdda, 2014)]. According to the dual-
processing framework of addiction, the neuroplasticity induced
by addictive drugs triggered by epigenetic mechanisms impacts
proteins in an intracellular level, modifying neurotransmitter
signaling in various neuronal circuits leading to an imbalance
between those areas that are associated with emotions and
reward (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum, and the
limbic system) – usually recruited during situations with stronger
affective salience (e.g., facing conditioned drug cues or stress) –
and those areas that are associated with more purely cognitive
processing and the activation of the dorsolateral parts of
the PFC (Volkow and Baler, 2014). Moreover, the imbalance
between “hot” and “cold” brain systems has also been used to
describe and explain risk-taking behaviors during adolescence,
such as unprotected sex, criminal behavior, drug use and
abuse, and accidents (Gladwin et al., 2011). Beyond social
and environmental factors, neurodevelopmental researchers
emphasized that the relatively early maturation of the “hot”
affective-motivational bottom-up system and the more slowly
developing “cold” top-down control system could explain
impulsive behaviors due to the difficulty in delaying gratification
(Benningfield et al., 2014), weighing of risks and benefits of a
set of actions (Pripfl et al., 2013), and use of ongoing outcomes
of these actions to monitor their own performance (Kluwe-
Schiavon et al., 2016).
Although dual-process models have explained important
issues, especially regarding decision-making, there are studies
suggesting that these models might be outdated (Reyna and
Brainerd, 2011; Gladwin and Figner, 2014). First, some authors
argue that dual-processing models cannot supply and predict
mechanisms for developmental reversals in cognition during
development, such as increased reasoning biases from childhood
to adulthood (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Reyna and Brainerd,
2011). Second, the boundaries between “hot” and “cold” executive
functions are not clear and, considering previous theories
regarding cognitive automaticity, it is not even clear if there are
such boundaries (Bargh, 1992; Moors and De Houwer, 2006).
Consequently, it became hard to investigate how individual
factors (e.g., personality traits or mood), developmental factors
(e.g., age and life experiences) and/or contextual factors (e.g.,
healthy or financial decisions and social interactions) – could
influence the “warmth” of a task (Peterson and Welsh, 2014),
thus requiring research to use decompositional approaches
(Moors and De Houwer, 2006). In fact, it is true that earlier
dual-processing models argued that a process is neither fully
controlled nor automatic (Bargh, 1992). Despite many studies
have discussed that “hot” and “cold” executive functions are
supported by an integrated neural network, and, therefore, might
be all interrelated (Zimmerman et al., 2016), in practice current
studies still assume significantly different concepts. Finally,
the third point is that dualistic conceptions (as well as the
central executive homunculus of Baddeley) were thought to be
didactically used to describe and explain complex behaviors.
However, the exception has become the rule and these dualistic
conceptions are replicated and measured as two independent
categories instead of two poles of the same gradient. In other
words, it is acceptable that “cold” executive functions are
measured with tasks that demand planning, working memory,
and concept formation, while “hot” executive functions are
measured with tasks that demand social cognition, empathy,
and emotion regulation (Zimmerman et al., 2016). In the
next section we briefly highlight a selection of studies that
support the idea that an executive functioning model should be
thought of as a frontal-subcortical circuit, in which emotions
(here stress) directly modulate the cognitive processes and vice-
versa.
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NEUROSCIENTIFIC FINDINGS TOWARD
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING
The idea that executive functions are not exclusive related
to frontal-cortical areas, but would involve frontal–subcortical
neuronal circuits is not new (Leh et al., 2010). Based upon
an evolutionary perspective, Ardila (2008) emphasized that
executive functions are mediated by dynamic and flexible
neuronal networks, questioning the central role of PFC in
the executive functions and, afterward, discussing how the
executive functions may have evolved in our species. Nonetheless,
questioning the central role of PFC in relation to executive
functions goes beyond suggesting that executive functions
involve subcortical networks, but in fact this also allow us
to question the hierarchical perspective in which PFC exerts
control over impulses and should be taken as the center of
rationality. Note that we do not intend to argue here that
the PFC does not exert a key role in cognitive and response
inhibition, but that there are enough evidences suggesting that
the relationship between cognition and emotion could be more
complex than the old-fashioned reasoning that the first (e.g.,
central executive, superego, or PFC) should control the second
(e.g., impulses, id, or limbic system). In this sense, here we focus
on those studies which suggested that some level of stress is
necessary to motivate the organism to act and allocate cognitive
resources to controlled processes, such as problem solving,
monitoring, and updating. After a certain level of stress, the
cognitive resources are reallocated in favor of more automatic
processes, decreasing working memory span and, in the last
instance, increasing response inhibition and unconditioned
behaviors, such as fight or flight responses. Additionally, we
mainly focus upon acute stress research since in the biological
and psychological fields the term has been commonly used to
describe external events capable of disrupting organism stability
or homeostasis.
The executive functioning hypothesis is supported by studies
that suggest that the PFC, especially medial areas, coordinates
the brain circuits that mediate emotional responses (Hermans
et al., 2014; McKlveen et al., 2015). This idea was deeply
investigated under the somatic marker hypothesis, which
demonstrated that the ventromedial PFC and its projections
to the orbitofrontal cortex are involved in both emotional
response and cognition (Bar-On et al., 2003; Li et al.,
2010). The somatic marker hypothesis suggested that body
signals (somatic markers) are represented and regulated in
the ventromedial PFC, since these somatic markers were not
found in people with lesions in this area, which are also
correlated with poorer performance on decision-making tasks
(Dunn et al., 2006). Additionally, the orbitofrontal cortex is
known to show an increased activity in response to stress
and it also is implicated in many cognitive functions, such
as working memory. In this sense, pre-clinical research has
hypothesized that acute stress can enhance working memory
performance by selectively increasing glutamatergic signaling
in PFC pyramidal neurons (Yuen et al., 2009). However, the
extent to which stress can have a positive or negative effect on
specific cognitive functions remains unclear. Barsegyan et al.
(2010), for example, demonstrated that acute stress triggers
working memory impairment and concurrent enhancement of
memory consolidation. Interesting, the authors emphasized the
interaction of glucocorticoid receptors and catecholaminergic
activity, suggesting that working memory impairment and
enhancement of memory consolidation shared a common neural
influence within the medial PFC via a common activation
of the noradrenergic signaling pathway (Barsegyan et al.,
2010).
These data reinforce the idea that the medial PFC is an
important integrator of the neuroendocrine and autonomic
systems, acting as a coordinator of stress responses. In addition,
these data also indicate that stress can be considered as a
stimulus that allocates energetic systems to respond to an
ongoing or anticipated challenge. McKlveen et al. (2015)
discussed that this allocation of energetic systems may occur
mostly via hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA-axis)
activation that culminate in the release of glucocorticoids
and catecholamines, which in turn leads to several alterations
in different brain systems in order to promote adaptive
behaviors. As an example of allocation of energy systems,
Hermans et al. (2014) have shown that acute stress shifts the
phasic activation of locus coeruleus toward a tonic mode
of activity, guiding attentional resources for potentially
salient information. This allocation of energy resources
could explain different behavior patterns observed during
stress.
In this regard, two meta-analyses were performed to
investigate the effects of psychosocial stress on executive
functions (Shields et al., 2016) and the effects of stress on
decisions made under uncertainty (Starcke and Brand, 2016).
In the first, the authors found that acute stress impaired
working memory and cognitive flexibility in humans.
Furthermore, Shields et al. (2016) suggested that within
inhibition, stress impaired cognitive inhibition (selectively
attending to or ignoring information) but enhanced response
inhibition. Concerning decision-making, Starcke and Brand
(2016) found that stress had significant effects only in
those situations in which increased reward seeking and risk
taking is disadvantageous and discussed that this finding
could be explained by two mechanisms: the first suggests
that acute stress should increase the reliance on immediate
and high rewards via alterations in dopamine release at
the cost of considering potential losses; while the second
mechanism suggests that stress may lead to unsystematic
decisions without considering all of the options and may
generally impair executive control via reductions of prefrontal
functioning (Shields et al., 2016). Taken together, their
findings are in agreement with the current perspective that
stress reallocates limited executive resources in adaptive
ways to facilitates adaptive decisions, although the authors
highlight that it is not clear what executive function
receives these reallocated resources and why (Shields et al.,
2016).
It is also hypothesized that stress-induced shifts in cognitive
functions occur because two different large-scale neuronal
networks (salience network and executive control network) may
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compete for limited resources, and as proposed by Hermans
et al. (2014), regulate externally directed attention. This model
goes further than the majority of “hot” and “cold” dualistic
perspectives because it introduces a dynamic interaction between
the delay between stressor onset and task performance, and
also because it considers the prefrontal areas as the key
structures supporting this “competition.” In a second meta-
analysis, Shields et al. (2015) investigated the effects of acute
cortisol administration on executive functions, focusing upon
working memory inhibition and set-shifting shifting. After
separating the genomic effects of cortisol (slow-acting effects
caused by the modulation of gene expression) from its non-
genomic effects (rapid-acting effects without the modulation
of gene expression) by controlling for the delay between
cortisol administration and cognitive testing, the authors found
interesting and divergent effects of the hormone in cognition
according to different time-windows post-administration. The
authors suggested that the non-genomic effects of cortisol
significantly impair working memory between 15 and 73 min
post-administration, but begins to improve working memory
after this period. However, the same effects of cortisol improve
inhibition from 15 to 135 min post-administration, but begins
to impair inhibition after this period, and no effects where
found related to set-shifting (Shields et al., 2015). This data
is in accordance with the idea that stress levels modulate
the allocation of cognitive resources in a dynamic perspective,
increasing inhibitory control and decreasing working memory
capacity, which we hypothesized could facilitate the organism to
engage in a logic deliberative reasoning to solve the problem.
Nevertheless, if this strategy was not sufficient to solve the
problem, individuals might use the working memory as an
automatic adaptive cognitive mechanism to guide behavior,
demanding less logic deliberative reasoning. Moreover, this meta-
analysis emphasized that the time course difference between
salience network and executive control network to reach the
peak and then return to the baseline could also be an important
feature to comprehend different effects of stress in the executive
functions. In the acute phase, neural resources are allocated
toward the salience network and the executive control network
is actively suppressed, while in the recovery phase, this effect is
reversed.
Here we argue that, at a primary level, a minimum
amount of stress is required in order to motivate the
organism to act and cognitively engage in problem solving
by decreasing working memory capacity. Unfortunately, there
are few studies directly investigating these effects and the
majority of evidences in this direction are based upon clinical
studies suggesting that stress could decrease the threshold to
act. For example, some authors suggest that schizophrenia is
primarily a frontostriatal disorder (Liu et al., 2011), in which
executive functions deficits and deterioration are a central
aspect of the disease [for a review see (Kluwe-Schiavon et al.,
2013)]. In this sense, recent findings in schizophrenia have
reconceptualised context processing as a function of proactive
and reactive cognitive control (Aron, 2011). Proactive control
can be comprehended as a form of default mode activated by
goal-relevant information before the occurrence of cognitively
demanding events, to optimally bias attention, perception, and
action systems in a goal-driven manner; while reactive control
is recruited only after the detection of a high-interference
event, favoring attentional control and response inhibition
(Anticevic et al., 2013). The proactive control depends upon the
updating and maintenance of contextual information, which in
turn, are associated with Gamma-aminobutyric Acid (GABA)
and glutamate neurotransmitter mechanisms and N-methyl-D-
aspartate (NMDA) receptor functioning. There are evidences
suggesting that in schizophrenia, the connectivity between
dorsolateral PFC and other cognitive control related brain
regions are associated with dopamine and GABAergic signaling
impairments, which support the information representation
in dorsolateral PFC (Barch and Ceaser, 2012). Thus, such
dysfunction in dopamine and GABAergic signaling may
explain, in part, some of the behavior difficulties observed in
schizophrenia related to proactive control, such as engaging
in a conversation or planning. The notion of proactive
control fits an executive functioning perspective because when
facing a minimum level of stress, patients diagnosed with
schizophrenia may have difficulties in allocating executive
functioning resources necessary to properly engage in adaptive
behavior.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that a “hot” vs. “cold” dichotomy
will remain as a source of hypotheses for research in cognitive
and experimental neuroscience. Although these dual-processes
models have contributed to the understanding of information
processing and brain disorders (Volkow and Baler, 2014),
research questions centerd upon a categorical epistemological
base seem to defy recent findings in the field (Morris and
Cuthbert, 2012). Current interdisciplinary efforts to integrate
“hot” and “cold” processes is timely and important since
psychological scientists have previously assumed that adaptive
behavior in real-world contexts involves continuous interactions
between emotional and cognitive processes (Peterson and Welsh,
2014).
Taken together, our main goal here is to highlight that
although the literature converges toward a dynamic role of
PFC as a coordinator of stress adaptation, executive functions
literature appears to be mostly focused upon hierarchical and
categorical approaches. More than inter-related components that
exert control over emotional salience, we propose that executive
functioning should be comprehended as the main processes
behind the allocation of cognitive resources in the face of a
challenge. In this sense, instead of looking for energization, one
can investigate the amount of stress that is needed to motivate
the organism to act; instead of looking for problem solving or
inhibitory control, one can investigate how long the organism
can keep the executive control network engaged without shifting
energy resources for working memory and salience network
during a mild, moderate, or severe stress challenge. Instead of
looking for cognitive flexibility, one can investigate how fast the
organism can retrieve and adapt conditioned behavior schemas
to cope with a new scenario. This dynamic perspective considers
executive functioning as continuum process that could be used
to identify how adaptable the organism is to an unpredictable
environment.
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A DYNAMIC EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING
HYPOTHESIS
Our dynamic executive functioning hypothesis emerged from
a fundamental question raised by Barkley (2001), “Why did
humans develop executive functions?” Taking an evolutionary
perspective, we argue that executive functioning emerged from:
(a) the ability to solve immediate problems and generalize
successful strategies; and (b) the ability to synthesize and organize
environmental information in view of identifying uniformities
that allow predictions about nature and future. From our
perspective, these abilities are intrinsically related with two
fundamental assumptions that are omitted by the majority of
executive functions models. The first is a motivational feature
that refers to the necessity of an existent problem to be solved,
in other words, a motivational variable that might stress the
organism and instigate the goal-oriented behavior. The second
refers to the optimization of future solutions based upon previous
experience, which is an ontogenetic assumption based upon
the combination of the ability to generalize successful strategies
along development and the ability to predict problems. The first
assumption instigates the necessity to include a motivational
variable derived from an internal or external stressful event
capable of disturbing the organism homeostasis. Thus, this
motivational aspect should be comprehended as a continuum
that represents levels of homeostasis disturbance. The second
assumption suggests that executive functions could be considered
a “cyclical” process (that is why we refer to it as executive
“functioning”), in which the main goal is to automatize efficient
solutions that were cognitively demanding in the past, enabling
individuals to allocate cognitive resources to the executive control
network to solve new complex problems.
Here we proposed a schematic model to illustrate that the
executive functioning could be comprehended as a balance
between the salient network and the executive control network
(Figure 1A). Differently from the majority of dual-processing
models in which the strongest activation of salient network
necessarily culminates in the weakness of cognitive executive
control network, our theoretical hypothesis suggests that the
strength and the direction of the relationship between these two
networks would be indicative of optimal or impaired executive
functioning. In optimal executive functioning, the organism
FIGURE 1 | Dynamic executive functioning hypothesis. (A) Dynamic executive functioning hypothesis: our theoretical hypothesis suggests that organisms tend
to maintain a homeostatic state (H). Stress occurs, when any environmental demand gradually triggers goal-oriented behaviors, firstly using habitual responses and
adapting it to adjust to the new demand. In an optimal executive functioning, when the ongoing behavior is insufficient to respond to environmental demands the
emotional salience network reaches a peak (a), the organism would be able to inhibit disruptive automatic behaviors such as fight or flight responses and to use the
available information (emotional salience and previous behaviors) to successfully respond to the environmental demand, decreasing the emotional salience and
decoding the new contingencies (b). Once the new contingencies are decoded, the organism would repeatedly use the successful behavior (c) to completely solve
the environmental demand and, then, returning to the homeostatic state (H). (B) Traditional multicomponent models. (C) Dual-processing models.
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should be able to quickly adjust the ongoing behavior when faced
with a stressful event. To do so, the organism should retrieve
previous successful strategies and should be flexible enough to
adapt these strategies if necessary. The executive functioning lies
in the amount of stress necessary to motivate problem solving and
the amount of cognitive effort demanded to solve the problem.
If the organism is not sufficiently sensitive to identify potentially
stressful events and to initiate an adaptive response in time, this
would suggest a failure in updating environmental information.
If the problem-solving demands a greater amount of cognitive
effort that does not correspond to the difficulty level of the task,
this results in a failure in monitoring the ongoing behavior or in a
lack of cognitive flexibility. If the organism is not able to maintain
the ongoing goal-oriented behavior with a certain level of stress,
or if the organism shifts to habitual (or reflexive) responses, even
with a minor increase of the stress levels, this would suggest a
failure in inhibitory control.
In this perspective, traditional executive components (i.e.,
updating, monitoring, problem solving, cognitive flexibility,
and control inhibition) could not be accessed without taking
into account their role in the entire adaptive process and the
optimization of cognitive effort due to a perceived stress. In this
sense, different from the majority of traditional multi-component
models of executive functions that emphasized high-order quality
of the cognitive processes, or the majority of dual-processing
models that expanded the traditional models investigating the
“mirrored” features (Figures 1B,C), the dynamic executive
functioning hypothesis – based upon the salience and executive
control neuronal networks proposed by Hermans et al. (2014) –
intended to set aside these conceptual categorical borders
commonly used to define executive behaviors, suggesting that an
optimal adaptive process would consider the constant interaction
between an emotional salience axis and executive controlled axis.
As shown in Figure 1, executive functioning would: (1)
constantly monitor the environment, adjusting the ongoing
behavior as soon as new demands are identified; and (2) promote
the automation of successful behavioral strategies. The first point
is in accordance with the first assumption presented in the
beginning of this section. Considering that executive functioning
is an adaptive process, it means that without any environmental
demand the organism remain in a homeostatic state, for
example the so-called Default Mode Network that usually is
found when neuroimaging studies investigate participants at rest
(Damoiseaux et al., 2006). However, even without a demand
capable of triggering goal-oriented behaviors, people still need
to monitor and perceive environmental changes, which is likely
supported by the synchronicity found between the brain salience
network and default mode network at rest, whose disruption
falls over dysfunctional thinking (Orliac et al., 2013). The second
point means that as soon as a new goal-oriented behavior achieves
success in responding to environmental demand, it should be
added to the repertoire of successful behavioral strategies of the
organisms. This point refers directly to the second assumption
also presented in the beginning of this section, which claims that
executive functioning should be comprehended as a continuous
adaptive process that enables the organism to save cognitive
resources when faced with the same environmental demand.
This aspect has a key evolutionary purpose since the organism
would be able to retrieve previous information to solve similar
environmental demands without allocating additional efforts to
learn completely new strategies. Even though automaticity has
been largely discussed and still lacks consensus, most views of
automaticity share the assumption that training and repetition
may lead to changes in effort and cognitive demands (Moors and
De Houwer, 2006).
Furthermore, executive functioning could be exemplified in
daily life situations, particularly, since when we face a new
environmental demand (an important appointment or any
unpredictable event) cognitive resources should be allocated to
cope with that event. Indeed, even relatively low-level cognitive
processes can be regulated through environmental stimulus, such
as priming. Some authors have suggested that selective attention
could be comprehended as a strategic self-regulatory process,
since it allows that individuals focus their attention on the goal-
relevant information (Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2004). Thus, it
seems to be counterintuitive to think that an individual can
be emotionally engaged with a certain task while no cognitive
resources are allocated to cope with it, at least, on some basic
attentional level.
To give another example of our executive functioning
hypothesis, we propose a re-interpretation of the most popular
example of prefrontal lobe lesion and executive dysfunction,
Phineas Gage. The case was first published by Harlow (1868)
and since then has inspired the executive functions research and
modern hypotheses, such as the somatic marker (Damasio, 1995).
Not surprisingly, great attention is given to the fact that the
reliable and hardworking foreman miraculously survived after a
serious accident in which a tamping iron went through his frontal
lobe. Even more surprisingly is that approximately 3 months
after the accident, Gage was recovered enough to travel and meet
his family. However, in a later report, Harlow (1868) described
that previous to his injury Gage “was looked upon by those who
knew him as a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic and
persistent in executing all his plans of operation,” but afterward
he was “no longer Gage.” Although many executive functions
models have focused on this point, to illustrate our hypothesis
we briefly highlight a peculiar moment that may have happened
few minutes before the accident.
According to some reports, Gage’s task consisted of adding
blasting powder and a fuse in a hole drilled into the rock, then
using the tamping iron to pack sand into the hole above the
powder. After “the powder and fuse had been adjusted in the
hole, and he was in the act of ‘tamping it in,’ his attention was
attracted by his men in the pit behind him” (. . .) “at the same
instant dropping the iron upon the charge, it struck fire upon
the rock, and the explosion followed” (Harlow, 1868). Within our
perspective, the failure in maintaining the primary attentional
focus on the task could also be described as an executive
functioning failure. After a couple of months of performing the
same tasks and procedures, it is possible that the individual
became used to it, automating some behaviors. In the meantime,
the emotional salience associated with the dangerousness of the
task also decreased and the likelihood to commit a mistake
gradually increased. In other words, it is possible that Gage was
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working in an automatic-resting state and was not able to update
the new environmental demand in time. The same would have
occurred with any individual working on an assembly line, or any
other activity that requires repeating a series of procedures during
a certain period.
On the contrary, during a lecture, teachers should be
cognitively engaged to maintain the attentional focus on the
topic, while delivering an informative but attractive speech.
Their work require highly specialized knowledge and abilities;
integrating a series of cognitive processes, such as perception,
attention, memory, theory of mind, etc. The teachers in this
example would be able to easily maintain low levels of stress and
we could argue that they behave in a resting-control state, which
is enough to keep them alert but not hypervigilant. The resting-
control state is responsible for the majority of goal-oriented
behaviors, and it is commonly described as the high-order
cognitive abilities associated with traditional multi-component
models of executive functions. Continuing with this example,
after a 3-h lecture some arrogant students become bored, making
noise and telling jokes. The teacher easily becomes stressed,
but he/she maintains the same level of his/her lecture, while
thinking about the available options to solve this annoyance.
The teacher behaves in an “emotional salient-control” state,
in which maintaining the executive functioning is extensively
exhausting. After asking for respect and silence more than once,
a laugh is heard and the teacher immediately yells at students
to leave the class. The executive functioning was not enough to
inhibit the response and for that reason it could illustrate an
“emotional salient-automatic” behavior that solved the problem,
but makes the teacher embarrassed. Without the arrogant and
noisy students, the teacher relaxes and the lecture continues,
now in a resting-automatic state. Although Figure 1 suggests
an adaptive process in which the organism goes through the
same states, but in a specific direction (i.e., H, a, b, c), this
example also shows that the executive functioning is constantly
regulating the allocation of cognitive resources and emotional
salience. The next time that the teacher faces a similar situation,
he/she could utilize gist representations of the previous event,
taking effective split-second decisions without reaching the peak
of stress.
The theoretical hypothesis of executive functioning is not
intended to go against any specific model or theory, but compile
some important features already observed and deeply discussed
by other models. Therefore, our goal is to integrate these
features to suggest a more comprehensive executive functioning
hypothesis, focusing on a continuous adaptive process. The
similarities between different models of executive functions are
evident when considering the key issues that these models seek
to explain: How automatic responses are suppressed in favor
of controlled responses? Are controlled responses effortful? If
yes, in which way? How working memory capacity influences
the suppression of automatic responses and the variability of
controlled responses? What are the roles of executive functions in
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive self-regulation? Considering
these, some comparisons with previous models and theories
could help to elucidate some features of our executive functioning
perspective.
In this sense, Teuber (1972) was one of the first researchers to
synthesize and discuss evidences that the PFC could anticipate
consequences based upon sensory systems information,
elucidating that emotional responses could be necessary to
adequate cognitive functioning in some circumstances. His
studies proposed an executive functions framework with a
twofold gradient, including a vertical up–down gradient (related
to emotional reactivity) and a horizontal back-to-front gradient
(related to delay-response task) that modulates sensory systems
in anticipation of future changes (Teuber, 1972). The two-fold
gradient model from Teuber greatly influenced many future
works, as well as the present hypothesis, because it emphasized
that a certain level of emotional responses should be important
to goal-oriented behaviors. Further studies from Fuster (2006),
Stuss and Levine (2002), and Zelazo and Carlson (2012), for
example, investigated the energizing effect of emotions in
cognition and the self-regulatory aspects of executive functions.
Another important issue of our executive functioning
hypothesis refers to the adaptive capacity of the organism to
retrieve previous successful strategies. This idea was mostly
based upon the model from Norman and Shallice (1983), which
postulated that automatic responses should be suppressed in
favor of more assertive ones. Initially, the idea of an automatic-
controlled axis corroborates with the notion of an attentional
control – described by Norman and Shallice (1983) as SAS –
that emerged when routine schemas become unable to deal with
non-routine circumstances. The major contribution of SAS to
our perspective is based upon the idea that our attention could
operate in different well-defined levels. Moreover, in accordance
with the authors, the SAS indicates that individuals applied
previously learned strategies to novel problems, highlighting
that an executive functioning may be critical for adaptive
behavior and the improvement of cognitive schemes for problem
resolutions, as we discussed. By this token, it also has similarities
with the theoretical and conceptual analysis of automaticity
proposed by Moors and De Houwer (2006) by assuming that
practice can lead to less effort in processing – something that
some call automaticity – and that cognitive functioning works
in a gradual manner. However, this model assumes that this
dynamic process works through different features involved in
automatic and controlled processes separately, and that the
combination of some of these features that may influence types
of behaviors/processes that we often call automatic, should in fact
be considered an umbrella term for a range of features.
Interestingly, the capacity to improve previous cognitive
schemes may be related to the capacity of self-monitoring and
behavior inhibition since individuals might be able to anticipate
future outcomes according with their own behavior (Barkley,
2001). Barkley (2001) also suggests that an executive functions
model may take into account an evolutionary principle of
gradualism. Therefore, executive functions may be understood as
a continuum form of mental capacity that might be observed in
other species, in which human beings show the higher capacity
of mental representation concerning future perspectives and
the ability to inhibit undesirable behaviors (Barkley, 2001). In
this sense, the capacity to constantly update environmental
contingencies and inhibit behaviors also seems to be a central
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aspect in our perspective since it allows the individual to
transit by all behavioral states (Figure 1), predicting hypothetical
futures based upon previous experiences and them inhibiting an
automatic response in favor of a controlled one (SAS influence).
More recently, Asp et al. (2013) defined this monitoring/
updating characteristic of inhibitory control as the False Tag
Theory (FTT), suggesting that affective processes signalize
inappropriate responses (“false tags”). In order to include
affective processing, the authors also suggest that the capacity
to “false tag” inappropriate responses has a limited resource,
which can be taxed during periods of high cognitive work (Asp
et al., 2013). In this sense, the FTT extended the Somatic Marker
Theory (SMT) proposed by Damasio (1996), which elucidated
that decision-making is an emotion-dependent process that is
wrought through the repetition of experiences. However, FTT
proposes how affective signaling could operate with cognitive
processes, showing that if there is a concurrent requirement of
both “false tagging” to perceptual and cognitive representations,
there can be competition for the “false tagging” resource and
the efficacy of each process may be decreased (Asp et al., 2013).
For our perspective, it corroborates with the idea that cognitive
processes are influenced by emotional salience, facilitating or
biasing cognitive processes.
Finally, our executive functioning hypothesis is in accordance
with the Hot-Cold Decision Triangle (Yang et al., 2012) and
the Tri-dimensional Processing model (Varga and Hamburger,
2014). First, both models emerged as a criticism of standard dual-
processing models, each one focusing on different arguments.
Yang et al. (2012) discuss that effortlessly and effortful cognitive
engagement are mediated by an emotional processing, the model
suggests that optimal and healthier decisions are influenced by
the extent to which System 1 overlaps System 2. Our perspective
of executive functioning is different from the Hot-Cold Decision
Triangle because their model assumes a prescriptive framework
in which optimal decisions are made with less emotional
engagement. Moreover, the Tri-dimensional Processing model
also added an important issue concerning the continuous
dimensions of information processing. However, the authors
did not suggest it as an executive functioning outcome, derived
from the interaction between automatic-controlled behaviors and
emotional salience. This interaction was deeply discussed by
Ernst (2014), who suggested that the efficient adaptive behavior
would result from the balance between appetitive (striatum-
dependent) and avoidant (amygdala-dependent) processes. In his
model, PFC works as a “conductor” and regulates approach-
avoidant behaviors according to environmental demands (Ernst,
2014).
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Instead of presenting a new model, the executive functioning
hypothesis presented here should question the current
hierarchical and categorical framework and be interpreted
as an alternative perspective for future studies. An executive
functioning perspective may favor novel discussions about
which individual factors can mediate the balance between
emotional salience and automatic-controlled behaviors. For
example, the threshold of the amount of stress that someone
could tolerate to maintain goal-oriented behaviors (emotional
salient-controlled state) and not act impulsively (emotional
salient-automatic state), may be influenced by personality traits
and early experiences, as well as developmental stages and
genetic background. Specifically, positive and negative urgency
are individual characteristics that are marked by the ineffective
control of decisions under extreme emotional states, and
particularly, people react differently under different emotional
states (Cyders and Smith, 2008). There are some individuals who
react rashly to emotional states with positive valences (which
means they present positive urgency), and there are people who
can react rashly only under negative emotional states (which
means they present negative urgency). It has been documented
that a combination of personality factors contributes to positive
and negative urgency (Gay et al., 2008). With regards to genetic
factors, there are evidences suggesting that polymorphisms in the
dopamine receptors and serotonin transporters genes are related
to positive and negative urgency related to decision-making
[for a review about positive and negative urgency and those
consequences for behavior, see (Billieux et al., 2010).
Moreover, as reviewed by Peterson and Welsh (2014), an
additional feature that should be clearly elucidated concerns
the emotional-salience axis. Although dual-processing models
theoretically assume that “cold” and “hot” are not independent
features of executive functions, in practice the “thermal gradient”
between them is still poorly understood. Future researches in
experimental psychological should manipulate the “temperature”
of a single task (Peterson and Welsh, 2014). Using an interesting
approach combining behavioral economic and computational
modeling, Summerfield et al. (2011) investigated the allocation of
higher-order cognitive strategies by manipulating the volatility of
the environment (i.e., the level of uncertainty when environment
can change rapidly and without warning). On the other hand,
a computational working memory model seems to fit the
individual’s behavior better during high-volatile (i.e., uncertainty)
scenarios. Interesting, the authors suggested that the optimal
(Bayesian) decision model predicted-related activity in more
posterior regions of the medial PFC while anterior regions of
the medial PFC actively respond when decisions are based on
motivational information (Summerfield et al., 2011). Likewise,
our recent work suggested that during scenarios in which
participants have no knowledge about their own performance
and lower emotional arousal responses (for more details see
Huang et al., 2013), their behavior is mostly modulated by
the use of the available information in the decision scenario.
Conversely, if some feedback is provided, participants tend to use
less or even no available information about the environmental
risks (Kluwe-Schiavon et al., 2016). These data are in line with
the idea that contingency learning, habitual behavior, and goal-
directed behavior could be studied as a continuum modulated by
the uncertainty of the environment. Furthermore, manipulating
these variables – environmental volatility or the presence of
feedback – in experimental contexts might be an effective
way to understand behavioral and neural mechanisms behind
updating previously learned schemas. Bearing in mind that our
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model considers an executive functioning that updates itself
continuously, integrating both external and internal homeostatic
changes, stress paradigms, such as the Trier Social Stress Test
(TSST), seem to be a promising option. In this sense, it should
be noted that a recent study showed that stressful situations
mimicked by the TSST, elicited a stronger activation of the PFC
associated with a risky decision-making process (Gathmann et al.,
2014).
Additionally, one could question how our executive
functioning hypothesis would account for dissociation between
different components of executive functions that can be observed
in health and mental illness (e.g., how would this hypothesis
account for impaired reasoning and problem solving but intact
working memory, or impaired working memory but intact
inhibitory control). As supported by Summerfield et al. (2011),
a dimensional perspective of executive functioning would be
able to identify the amount of environmental volatility that
someone may confront until goal-oriented responses shift to
habitual responses. In this sense, it is still possible that someone
could have an intact working memory and impaired problem
solving, especially because according to our hypothesis, good
performance in working memory could favor the individual
to respond to the environmental demand based upon ongoing
feedback, without necessarily allocating excessive cognitive
resources to planning and problem solving. The same could
occur with someone who has an impaired working memory but
intact inhibitory control. In this case, someone that presents
a decrease in working memory capacity (meaning that less
information is retained in his/her memory span) could also
present high behavioral variability, which is different from
impulsivity or impairments in inhibitory control. It is possible
that the same person would not have problems in inhibiting
an automatic response when a high emotional-salient stimulus
is shown. However, it is true that according to our hypothesis,
it would be harder to explain someone who has an impaired
working memory but has no difficulties in successfully planning
goal-oriented behaviors. This point is important, once more, to
illustrate that the current categorical multi-component view of
executive functions is still focused on classifying which behaviors
should represent cognitive flexibility or inhibitory control
(Diamond, 2013), instead of understanding each behavior as a
reflex of an adaptive process.
Finally, when we propose different axis we are not assuming
consistently that there is a marked frontier between each axis,
but we perform an estimation that is relative for understanding
proposes. This criteria is similar to that suggested by Moors
and De Houwer (2006) when they flagged one limitation of
theories that use gradual models. In this sense, further studies
could be done to clearly define emotional-salience states and
automatic-controlled responses in order to measure it accurately.
Based upon a behavioral perspective, it is possible to infer
that automatic responses could be defined as those reflexive
or conditioned responses. We hypothesized that automatic
responses are more likely to occur in an environment with a
very high or very low emotional-salience. Moors and De Houwer
(2006) discussed that we can identify automaticity by viewing
components/features that probably play a more significant role
in less controlled processes (e.g., unconscious, unintentionally,
or autonomous processing). This view indicated the need to
use decompositional methods to investigate automaticity and
highlighted that some combinations of different features can give
us insight into the dynamics of cognitive control (Moors and De
Houwer, 2006). On the other side of the automatic-controlled
axis, controlled responses could be defined as those goal-oriented,
non-conditioned responses that according to our hypothesis,
are more likely to occur with middle-level emotional-salience.
However, a clear definition of emotional-salience state is needed.
For example, as discussed by Shields et al. (2016) and extensively
described by McEwen et al. (2015), the effects of stress on
executive functions goes beyond cortisol alone and the HPA-axis,
since circulating proinflammatory cytokines can also have an
impact on working memory (Marsland et al., 2006) and cognitive
flexibility (Levandowski et al., 2016). Further studies should
investigate multiple hormones and immune system processes in
order to deeply understand the biological mechanisms behind the
effects of stress on executive functions (Shields et al., 2016).
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